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BRIEF FOR
CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF
ON

STRATEGIES TO STEM OUT MILITANT
ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE JOINT TASK
FORCE OPERATION RESTORE HOPE
AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

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STRATEGIES TO STEM OUT MILITANT ACTIVITIES WITHIN
THE JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATION RESTORE HOPE
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INTRODUCTION

1. Militant activities in the Niger Delta is a hydra-headed monster. The issue of marginalization may have given birth to militancy, but it is now driven by a number of factors, all of which border on criminality. These factors are illegal oil bunkering, hostage taking for ransom, peddling of influence for financial gains from oil companies, Niger Delta states and federal governments and projection of political power, interests and political thuggery.

2. The various militant groups also contest for supremacy and spheres of influence amongst themselves. The group leaders, who adopted the name 'Commander' or 'Master', have little or no respect for royal fathers and

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- c. Movement for the Survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSSIFEND).
- d. Movement for Reparations to Ogbia. (MORETO).
- e. Ijaw Youth Council (IYC).
- f. Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF).
- g. Federated Niger Delta Izon Community (FNDIC).
- h. Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

Presently MEND is the largest, best organized and the principal perpetrator of militant activities within the Niger Delta. These various militant groups operate mainly within the numerous creeks which cross-cross the Niger Delta.

7. Other identified groups that have significantly compromised law and order within JTF Op RFI AOR but, who operate mainly onshore are several restive, disgruntled and jobless youths. Perhaps the most potent groups that have created an unfriendly atmosphere for socio-economic activities are illegal oil bunkerers, some elders, royal fathers, politicians and highly placed persons who pose as peace makers and negotiators but actually aid militancy. These groups of people are the financiers and supporters of both militants and restive youths in the creeks and urban areas.

8. Nature of Incidents. The nature of incidents perpetrated by the militants, restive youths and others are as follows:

- a. Attacks on military locations.
- b. Hostage taking/abduction/kidnapping.
- c. Illegal oil bunkering.
- d. Pipeline vandalization.
- e. Sabotage.
- f. Bombings.
- g. Attacks on oil companies' installations/facilities.

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- h. Piracy.
- i. Hijacking.
- j. Hindrance to economic activities on waterways.
- k. Armed robberies.
- l. Political thuggery.
- m. Illegal possession of arms and ammunition and gun running.
- n. Gen threats to lives and properties.

MILITANT CAMPS

9. There are several militant camps within Bayelsa and Delta States. The militant groups that have made more impacts in hostage taking, political thuggery and extortion of money from oil companies and Niger Delta state governments have big camps and are fairly well organized and equipped. The other groups that are small hope to become big through illegal exploits. The minor militant camps are usually splinter groups from major camps and encouraged to greater acts of criminality by the successes of the larger camps.

10. Each of the major camps has strength of between 150 and 200 militants while minor camps have less than 100 men each. The following lists of major and minor militant camps originate from our various intelligence sources:

a. Major Militant Camps in Bayelsa State.

- (1) Olugbobiri -- Leader is Joshua McKiver.
- (2) Korokosei -- Leader is Africa Owei.
- (3) Ikebiri I & II and Okiegbene/Ebriygbene -- leader is Gibson Kala (Prince Igodo).
- (4) Robert Creek.
- (5) Cowthern Channel.

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b. Minor Militant Camps in Bayelsa State.

- (1) Azuzuama -- Leader is "Commander" Jackson (The Young Shall Grow). Victor Ben also has a camp here.
- (2) Gbekeregbene
- (3) Ezetu -- Leader is Victor Ben.
- (4) Bilabiri
- (5) Agge -- Leader is Victor Ben.
- (6) Kurutiye.
- (7) Forupa.
- (8) Okubie.
- (9) Clough Creek.

c. Major Militant Camps in Delta State.

- (1) Camp 5 - led by Government Ekpompolo.
- (2) Okerenkoko " "
- (3) Opuraza Government Ekpompolo.

d. Minor Militant Camps in Delta State.

- (1) Ubefan.
- (2) Berger Camp

THREAT ASSESSMENT

11. Threat assessment within JTF Op RH AOR will be centred on militant strengths, re-enforcements capabilities, equipment and propaganda capabilities. Others include activities of oil companies and the intrigues of politicians.

- a. Militant Strength and Reinforcement Capabilities. Most major camps have strength of 150 -- 200 militants during periods of

inactivity and 200 – 500 militants before and after any illegal operation. The minor camps have lesser number of militants. The various militant camps are usually antagonistic towards one another because they compete for sphere of influence. However, attack by the military on any of them is likely to unite them against their common 'enemy'. Thus, each camp is capable of being reinforced up to 500% of its regular strength in self defence and in support of any camp attacked by the military. So put together, the camps in Bayelsa and Delta States could muster over 1000 and 800 militants respectively within hours if attacked by the military. However, they are not well trained, but are bold when under the influence of hard drugs and believe that their juju charms protect could them from arms fire.

b. Equipment, Arms and Ammunition. Most militant camps have the following types of equipment, arms and corresponding ammunition:

- (1) AK 47 rifles.
- (2) GPMG.
- (3) BMG.
- (4) RPG 7.
- (5) Speed boats.
- (6) Gun boats (speed boats locally configured to bear some GPMG/BMG mounted).
- (7) Anti Aircraft (confirmed to be in Camp 5).

Every major camp has almost enough of the above support weapons as an infantry unit and sufficient personnel to counter any attack. Details of locations, strengths, equipment, arms and ammunition of some major camps is attached as Annex A.

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c. Propaganda. One vital instrument of winning modern operations is through propaganda. The militants and their sponsors seem to have perfected this art. They drum up support for their 'cause' and try to convince all that their activities are not criminal. Each time the JTF Op RH responds to militant attacks and inflict casualties, the electronic and print media more often than not take sides with militants. This suggests that the government and the JTF Op RH are losing the propaganda war. This is capable of frustrating the attainment of the end state of this Operation RH.

d. Activities of Oil Companies. It is common knowledge that oil companies award security related contracts to known militant leaders. Niger Delta state governments and oil companies are also quick to pay handsome ransoms demanded by hostage takers. The militants use the monies from the contracts and ransoms to equip and sustain their illegal activities.

e. Activities of Politicians. It is disconcerting that Camp 5 has become a pilgrim centre for some important politicians, especially those from the Niger Delta. These constant visitations to a known criminal legalize the activities of the militants, embolden and empower them financially and emotionally. For example, the Governors of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States at various times after their inauguration visited Camp 5. Recently, the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria also visited Camp 5 on 28 Jun 07 without security details accompanying him there just because the militants said so.

TERRAIN ANALYSIS

12. The terrain of most parts of the Niger Delta is no doubt severely restricted to both infantry and armour. The situation is worse in the riverine

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communities, which are interspersed with creeks. This terrain is defenders haven. For the militants, who have lived all their lives in this environment, it does not constitute much hindrance to their activities. The much hindrance the terrain offers to the NA troops is directly proportional to the advantage it confers on the militants. Their good knowledge of the terrain enhances their guerilla tactics.

13. The advantages the terrain confers to the militants can be neutralized by combat air operations, using helicopter gun ships. Employment of sufficient fast patrol crafts can also assist troops to beach land safely and gradually wade through the creeks to seize objectives. However, the operation will be intensive in manpower and will also demand close air support, casualty evacuation and supply by air.

STRATEGIES FOR STEMMING OUT MILITANT ACTIVITIES

14. Like in all crisis resolution efforts, strategies are required to achieve peace and security in the entire Niger Delta. The efforts required to realize this is multi-dimensional. In campaign planning, these multi-dimensional means are referred to as lines of operation. To stem out militants in the Niger Delta with particular reference to Bayelsa and Delta States and restore law and order, the following lines of operation will be pursued concurrently:

- a. Political line of operation.
- b. Information/psychological line of operation.
- c. Military line of operation.

Each of these lines of operation will be highlighted but more emphasis will be given to the military line of operation.

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POLITICAL LINE OF OPERATION

15. The political masters have to pursue dialogue with a view to persuading the militants to lay down their arms. It is envisaged that this is a viable means granted that the Niger Delta political and traditional leaders are sincere and not just using the crisis as means of livelihood. All promises for physical development should be based on timed programmes so that evaluation of progress can be possible. The Niger Delta political, traditional and militant leaders would undertake to ensure peace and security as long as development efforts are on course. Youth restiveness can be effectively curtailed if the political leadership undertakes job creation to engage the youths productively.

16. Political Will to Confront Illegal Oil Bunkering. One of the most potent threats to law and order in the Niger Delta is illegal oil bunkering. All the militant groups are involved in oil bunkering, which is said to be a very lucrative business. Some of the crude oil is given in exchange for arms and ammunition, while some attract outright cash. The militants rake in so much money from this illegal activity, which they also use to purchasing of arms, ammunition, speed boats and also sustain the militant activities. This constitutes serious threat to peace and security. Chasing the militants in the creeks to stop this unwholesome act is not only difficult, but hazardous. The illegal activity takes place in the hours of darkness in the depth of the creeks. In these hours of darkness it is almost impossible for security agents to do anything meaningful. The way out is for the NN and NAF to be given full approval to sink the ships used by the bunkering masters that hangout on the high sea waiting for the crude oil. If the ships are not available to buy the crude, the urge to bunker will die naturally. The flow of arms, ammunition and finances to the militants through this source will also come to an end. The political will to combat illegal bunkering should not only be apparent but potent. Crude oil they say is of little value until it's refined, hence the urgency

for the Federal Government to find the refiners to which the crude is being taken to and shut them down, or dry up their supply.

INFORMATION/PSYCHOLOGICAL LINE OF OPERATION

17. Militant and guerrilla activities derive their strength from community support and propaganda, among others. In the Niger Delta, militant activities thrive most in the communities that buy into their illegal activities. For instance, in Okerenkoko and Oporaza and Kurukununa (all in Gbaratama Kingdom), the traditional rulers and the communities are parts and parcel of MEND and are very hostile to security agencies. This is why this militant group enjoys freedom of action in these riverine communities. Conversely, some communities that are hostile to militants are friendly and helpful to security agencies. The will of the militants will be broken if they no longer enjoy community support.

18. Well packaged propaganda operations could turn the Niger Delta population against the militants. This is more so if the crimes of the militants are carefully compiled and continuously relayed in print and electronic media. Again, communities will be warned of the implications which military operations will bear on their lives and property if they continue to harbour the militants. The sensitization efforts will not only be local but played up to international level to pre-empt hostile media blitz that may criticize and stir up negative feelings against military operations. Well articulated information/psychological operations will help to sway public opinion in favour of military operations. It will not only help to win the battles but will also assist in winning the peace.

MILITARY LINE OF OPERATION

19. The military line of operation should run concurrently with the other lines of operation. For dialogue to succeed, it should be backed up with

information/psychological operations and at least limited military operations. None of the 3 lines of operations can easily succeed in isolation. Military operation is therefore a necessity for stemming out militant activities in the JTF Op RH AOR.

20. The fact that the militants are fellow Nigerians, military operation that will only inflict minimum collateral damage to lives and property will need to be adopted. This implies that detailed intelligence on all the militant camps will have to be sourced. This will help to identify the strengths, weaknesses and the extent to which they co-habit with civil communities.

21. To deal with the militants in their camps, 2 options will be considered.

a. Option 1. To fix the major militant camps and strike the minor camps first. This is in line with the concept of manoeuvrist approach to warfare, where you fix the adversary at his point of strength and strike him from his weak point with full strength.

(1) Advantages.

- (a) The minor camps can be taken easily, troops morale will be built up for more difficult objectives.
- (b) It will serve as avenue for training troops for future tasks.
- (c) Less casualty.
- (d) Less troops and equipment required to attack each camp.
- (e) If fixing operations is effective, the militants will be destroyed piece meal, except they lay down their arms and escape through the swamps.

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(f) The use of their speed/fast patrol crafts may be frustrated since all waterways may be made untenable through blockade operation.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) The militants may escape through swamps and re-locate to the major camps for coordinated attack against own locations.

(b) The militants in the major camps may commence mass destructions/vandalization of oil facilities.

(c) If the militants corporately attack any fixing force, they may breakthrough, inflict maximum casualty on them and move on offensive operation.

b. Option 2. To conduct massive attacks on at least 2 of the major camps (one each in Bayelsa and Delta States) simultaneously.

(1) Advantages.

(a) The successful routing of major camps in both states would significantly reduce or eliminate militancy in the Niger Delta.

(b) The routing of major camps would dissuade minor camps from further militant activities while discouraging those who were at the verge of joining militancy.

(c) More militant casualties.

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their deployments. Additionally, the troops would be required for blockade operations while the additional troops would then be engaged in the striking operations. In the advent of widespread destruction of oil industry's facilities and other acts of sabotage and bombings, it would be necessary to induct 2 additional battalions into the operations area at 7 days notice. These 2 additional units would be able to carry out pursuit operations and the strengthening and tightening of security within the entire AOR until the insurgency is curtailed.

JTF OP RESTORE HOPE REQUIREMENTS

24. The brief I gave on taking over as the Commander JTF Op RH (TFRH/25/G dated 30 Apr 07) contains our operational and logistics requirements. The requirements in the brief are still relevant. The JTF Op RH presently has 3 infantry units and an artillery battery employed on infantry role. It also has naval and air force components. JTF has 62 Fast Patrol Crafts (FPCs) out of which 46 are serviceable and 16 unserviceable.

25. The operation in the Niger Delta is a special one because of the nature of the terrain. Troops deployment is at numerous locations and in most cases isolated. It is desirable that each location be equipped to win any fire fight. Therefore, every location should have basic infantry support weapons like GPMG, BMG and RPG 7. However, it is unfortunate that most of the locations are equipped with personal weapons like AK 47 and FN rifles only. Each of the 3 units under command should be equipped beyond their established Table of Equipment (TOE) in arms. This is more so because troops attached from various units to ATG have been distributed to the units which resulted into bloated strengths of the units. The arms and ammunition requirements are attached as Annexes B and C. Bearing these in mind, other

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(d) Economic and social activities would resume faster and confidence of both local and international stake holders in the region would be rekindled.

(3) Disadvantages.

- (a) More casualty of own troops.
- (b) Own troops may suffer defeat or may be incapable of a decisive victory which would embolden the militants and lower own troops morale.
- (c) More troops and equipment would be committed to the operation.
- (d) Command and control would be stretched/more difficult.
- (e) Collateral damage would be more.

22. Militants enjoy camaraderie in the face of a common adversary. Also, their common goal and ethnic affinity ensure that they would easily be assimilated into other communities of the same ethnicity. Consequently, militants when attacked could easily relocate to other parts of the Niger Delta. It is therefore important that any offensive operation against militants should be conducted in the entire Niger Delta. The concurrent involvement of troops other than those of JTF Op RH and JTF Op FLUSHOUT III would be necessary. This may require that 4 and 13 Bdes as well as the ENC and WNC would at least be at alert to ward off migration of the militants to other parts of Niger Delta.

23. Offensive operations adopting either Option 1 or 2 would require the immediate deployment of one additional battalion to the operation area. This is important as troops already deployed are holding vital and key locations within the JTF Op RH AOR and would be needed to continue to maintain

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resources to effectively conduct an offensive operation to stem out militant activities from the JTF Op RH AOR, are as follows:

a. Operational Requirements.

(1) One battalion to be inducted before commencement of any offensive operation. However, 2 x coys would be adequate to flag off.

(2) Two additional battalions to be ready for induction within 7 days should the militants embark on widespread destruction and bombings of oil companies facilities/installations.

(3) 68 x FPCs would be required to fix militants Zones A, B and C. The breakdown is as follows:

(a) FPCs Required to Fix Militant Camp Zone A (Delta State) From.

- i. 2 x FPCs at Jones Creek.
- ii. 2 x FPCs at Otumana.
- iii. 2 x FPCs at Otumara.
- iv. 4 x FPCs at Escravos.
- v. 4 x FPCs at Odidi.
- vi. 3 x FPCs at Yokri.
- vii. 4 x FPCs at Forcados.
- viii. 2 x FPCs at Batan.

Total 25 x FPCs.

(b) FPCs Required to Fix Militant Camp Zone B (Bayelsa State) From.

- i. 4 x FPCs at Yenagoa.
- ii. 2 x FPCs at Obama.
- iii. 4 x FPCs at Kolo Creek.

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ammunition available to the militants. Furthermore, propuganda, activities of oil companies and politicians were highlighted.

27. Terrain analysis examined the difficulties associated with the Niger Delta terrain in operations. The terrain posses little or no constraint to the militants. Strategies for stemming militant activities out of JTF Op RH AOR were discussed under 3 lines of operation. These are the political, information/psychological and military lines of operation. In the military line of operation 2 options were proposed. Option 1 considered the striking of minor camps while fixing major ones, while Option 2 proposed the conduct of concurrent massive attacks on at least 2 of the major camps (one each in Bayelsa and Delta States).

28. The operational and logistics requirements for an offensive operation were brought out. Operationally, the JTF Op RH would require an additional battalion or at least 2 x coys to conduct limited operations. Meanwhile, 2 additional units would be placed on alert for induction into operation areas in 7 days to counter any escalation in vandalization of oil pipelines. Additional 21 x FPCs and repairs of 16 unserviceable ones would be necessary for an offensive operation. Logistics requirements centre on POL.

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Annexes:

- A. Profile of Militant Groups in Southern Ijaw LGA, Bayelsa State.
- B. Arms Requirements.
- C. Ammunition Requirements.

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ANNEX A TO
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DATED JUL 02

PROFILE OF MILITANT GROUPS IN
SOUTHERN IJAW LGA, BAYELSA STATE

1. Southern Ijaw LGA is home to several militant groups that have been behind hostage taking incidents and attacks/vandalization on oil companies facilities in the State.
2. Below is a profile of 5 of the most notorious militants in the State, namely:
 - a. African OWEI (Commander).
 - b. Joshua MACKIVER (Commander).
 - c. Ebikabowei VICTOR-BEN (Boyloaf).
 - d. Gibson KALA (aka. Prince IGODO); and
 - e. Commander JACKSON (aka Young Shall Grow).

AFRICA OWEI

LOCATION OF CAMP

3. Present camp is near a creek "Osiaperemo", adjacent to Okugbene fishing camp, along the waterways in Korokorosei community. His main camp remains directly opposite a short canal dug between two waterways, one coming from Yenagoa after Oporoma, and the other leading in opposite

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direction towards Korokorosei, Ikebiri and Azuzuama communities. It is believed OWEI also has another camp at Azuzuama community, which serves as hideout.

STRENGTH

4. OWEI has about 200 regular fighters, though estimates put the total number at about 400 youths, with some girls serving as cooks and concubines.

WEAPON INVENTORY

5. OWEI has the following weapons:
- a. At least three (3) General Purpose Machine Guns.
 - b. At least fifty (50) assorted rifles, especially AK 47 and pump action guns.
 - c. Inexhaustible supply of ammunition and dynamites.

BOATS

6. Seventeen speed boats of which 3 are locally configured gun boats, usually mounted with GPMGs.

HOSTILE INTENT

7. OWEI is a jail bird with a murder charge against him. He started out as a political thug before graduating into full time criminal militant. His motive is

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to become a big time illegal oil bunkerer, as such, his intent is not the genuine Niger Delta struggle.

8. He has lost a lot of fighters, and a major spiritualist to what he believes to be unprovoked attack from JTF troops/soldiers guarding oil facilities in the Southern Ijaw axis. He thus holds a deep grudge against security forces.

JOSHUA MACKIVER

LOCATION OF CAMP

9. MACKIVER's camp is very difficult to access, as a result of the creek entrance. However, it is an abandoned fishing port, around the Olugbobiri area in Southern Ijaw LGA. See operational map for location of the camp.

STRENGTH

10. MACKIVER may have more than 300 fighters in his group.

WEAPONS INVENTORY

11. MACKIVER's group is armed with AK 47s and GPMGs. Recent intelligence reveals that he may have acquired RPG 7 launchers, with foreign mercenaries sighted at his camp, training some of the boys on handling the weapons. It is believed he traveled to South Africa in 2007, where he made arrangements to acquire the RPGs. He has the following weapons:

- a. 100 x AK 47

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- b. 15 x GPMGs
- c. 7 x RPG 7

HOSTILE INTENT

12. MACKIVER is also a jail bird who escaped from Port-Harcourt Prisons during the 2006 jail break. He is known to be jealous with a hostile disposition, and abhors direct contact with Government/Security officials, or with political stakeholders. He is also ready to become a big time illegal oil bunker, and his major targets remain Agip facilities. His motive of acquiring the RPGs is to target military air craft, as he is of the opinion that only an aerial operation can dislodge him.

EBIKABOWEI VICTOR-BEN

LOCATION OF CAMP

13. VICTOR-BEN has 3 camps. One in Ezetu and the other in Azuzuama, both in Southern Ijaw, while the third is in Agge, a border community between Ekeremor and Southern Ijaw LGAs.

STRENGTH

14. Although VICTOR-BEN only established his camps in the State from February to March 2007, he appears to have the most organized militant group. Strength of the fighters is estimated at between 200 – 300.

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WEAPONS INVENTORY

15. VICTOR-BEN was a trusted foot soldier of Asari DOKUBO, and operated in the Port-Harcourt axis with Dägogo FARAH. He is well armed and is known to be very close to a South African based arms dealer, Henry OKAH. Report indicates that he may also have acquired RPG launchers. He has the following weapons:

- a. 15 x GPMG.
- b. 120 x AK 47.
- c. 15 x Long Range BMG.
- d. 3 x RPG 7.
- e. 20 double 150 horse power speed boats.

HOSTILE INTENT

16. VICTOR-BEN's intent in the Niger Delta region is purely criminal, and is known to have a violent disposition. While he started out as a foot soldier in the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), VICTOR-BEN is bent on becoming an illegal oil bunkerer, and it is suspected he wants to overrun OWEI and MACKIVER, to become the principal militant leader in Bayelsa State. He is truly a militant with solid credentials of being affiliated with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

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GIBSON KALA (AKA PRINCE IGODO)

LOCATION OF CAMP

17. The camp of Prince IGODO is located at Okigbene Community in Southern Ijaw IGA, and his personal residence serves as his headquarters, and the armory of his heavy calibre weapons.

STRENGTH

18. IGODO has about 50 fighters, with ages between 17 and 21 years.

WEAPONS INVENTORY

19. IGODO, who is more of a sea pirate, also targets oil companies facilities. He has Uzi machine guns, GPMGs and some AK 47s, which appear not well serviced. He worked closely with Asari DOKUBO and knows the waterways of Southern Ijaw more than the other militants. He has the following weapons:

- a. 20 x AK 47
- b. 6 x GPMG
- c. 10 x Uzi
- d. Boats = 2 boats, usually mounted with machine guns
often serving as gun boats.
= 7 Speed boats, double 175 engines.

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HOSTILE INTENT

20. IGODO's intent appears more of coercing oil companies to offer him security contract job. He has already been declared wanted by the police and as such he is conscious of security forces, and abhors engagement with them.

COMMANDER JACKSON (AKA YOUNG SHALL GROW)

LOCATION OF CAMP

21. JACKSON's (Commander) Camp is located at the Azuzuama areas of Southern Ijaw, and seems to be a freelancer on the rise, but with loyalty to Government EKPOMPOLO, militant leader based in Okerenkoko, Delta State.

STRENGTH/WEAPONS

22. As an upstart in militancy, Young Shall Grow boasts of about 40 fighters, but it appears the group is well armed with AK 47s.

HOSTILE INTENT

23. The Young Shall Grow has a violent disposition. He participated in the abduction of expatriates from CONOIL's facility in Sangana, Brass LGA, in early May 2007. He was also the militant that led the attack on Vice President Goodluck JONATHAN's country home in Otueke, Ogbia LGA, and was the one who co-ordinated the attack on Yenagoa.

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MOST ACTIVE MILITANTS

24. The most active militant in the State are placed in the following order:
- a. Joshua MACKIVER.
 - b. Africa OWEI.
 - c. Ebikabowei VICTOR-BEN (Likely to overtake the others), because of his current supplies.
 - d. Commander JACKSON (aka Young Shall Grow); and
 - e. Prince IGODO.

CONCLUSION

25. Only recently, African OWEI and Joshua MACKIVER, took supplies of ammunitions, while Victor BEN took delivery of 17 new boats with new engines.

26. On the issue of actual strength of the various camps, It is important to note that each camp cannot muster those members indicated at any one time. The reason being that at all times, the camp commanders release half of the members for 2 weeks recess, to ease feeding and other logistics. It is only at the onset of operations that militants/fighters can be mobilized and would be demobilized after every operation.

26. Also, on the issue of weapons, camps can borrow weapons at short notice for specific assignments. Above all, some of these weapons are rusty and are exposed to moisture, which could result in malfunctioning of some.